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INTRODUCTION
One of the most common criticisms of international human rights
law, especially among lawyers, is that it is hortatory and unenforceable,
and indeed anyone who has tried to encourage or implement their State's
commitment to "ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoy-
ment of all civil and political rights"' knows how little concrete guidance
exists in the treaties themselves for meeting this goal. One of the other
major criticisms is that human rights law describes a string of sometimes
conflicting ideals that States must respect, without providing any pa-
rameters as to how rights are to be prioritized and reconciled.2 Ayelet
• J.D. cum laude, University of Michigan Law School, 2002; M.A., University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1999; B.M. and M.M. summa cum laude, Northwestern
University, 1997. The author wishes to thank Professors Karima Bennoune, Robert Howse,
and David Chambers for their assistance at all stages of this project.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 3, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2. See, e.g., Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a
Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 816 (1992).
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Shachar's book Multicultural Jurisdictions,3 published as part of Cam-
bridge University Press's Contemporary Political Theory series and
winner of the 2002 First Book Award of the Foundations of Political
Theory section of the American Political Science Association, offers in-
stitutional and theoretical insight into the particularly thorny problem of
respecting minority cultures at the national and local levels while pro-
tecting the individual equality rights of the women who live as members
of those minority groups. This Review will assess the extent to which
Shachar's political and theoretical solutions are compatible with certain
requirements of the international human rights regime.
The problem Shachar tackles can be understood as a subset of sev-
eral major recent theoretical disputes in law and political science: the
distinction between liberalism and communitarianism,4 the question of
how to implement multiculturalism,5 and the disputed universality of
human rights.6 At the international level, these debates manifest, for in-
stance, in the claim that human rights as described in United Nations
treaties are too individualistic and Western in outlook and do not reflect
the more communitarian philosophies of Asian and Islamic cultures, and
therefore should not be applied in non-Western nations. At the national
level, when cultural diversity is relatively limited, the claim is made that
local feminists agitating for reform of unjust family laws have absorbed
too much Western influence and that their ideas will lead to the decay of
national values and identity.! Shachar's particular area of interest is the
claim, made by minority groups in more culturally diverse polities, that
such groups should be shielded from laws that, in their view, interfere
with the practice and enjoyment of their culture.
Women's rights activists around the world are familiar with argu-
ments that rights are a concept incompatible with local traditions and
that local cultures are so good at meeting the needs of their members that
"our women don't need rights." Such activists will therefore be pleased
to hear that Shachar proposes a strategy of creating institutions and
3. AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS (2001).
4. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A
FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LiBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE (1993).
5. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
6. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Reservations and Objections to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS GENERAL
NORMS AND A STATE'S RIGHT TO OPT OUT 64 (J.R Gardner ed., 1997).
7. See, e.g., Mark Clayton, Rights Controversy Clouds U.N. Conference, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 10, 1993, at 7.
8. See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, The Fateful Triangle: Islam, the West, and Patriarchy,




agreements between groups and the State that seeks to break through this
supposed impasse. Because so many women's activists rely heavily on
international human rights law as a political and legal basis for action,
this Review will address some aspects of how international law interacts
with a strategy that focuses very carefully on a certain type of local or
national legal-political problem.
Although any group might ask the State to craft special legislation
better able to meet its goals ("covenant marriage" in Louisiana,9 for in-
stance, comes to mind), Shachar focuses on groups that are particularly
disaffected from the State and in a situation she calls "reactive cultural-
ism."" She notes that while minority groups generally assimilate to
majority or outside cultures to some degree, certain voices within some
groups respond to their minority position by attempting to wall the group
off from the outside, demanding "a strict adherence to a group's tradi-
tional laws, norms, and practices as part of [the] identity group's active
resistance to external sources of change, such as secularism or moder-
nity."' Such strict adherence can take the forms of idealizing the image-
and culture-transmitting role of women in the family-especially where
the group's image and culture are thought to differ from those of the ma-
jority-and of interpreting departures from traditional hierarchy, textual
readings, or behavioral norms as evidence of the group's decay.'2 Such
situations can lead to a deadening of formerly flexible traditions,'3 mak-
ing traditional law and social sanctions less effective and less just when
transposed to a changing soeial context.'4 Women often bear the brunt of
such restrictions since their treatment under traditional group norms be-
comes the major symbolic contested issue; group members with
alternate readings of traditional practices become open to accusations of
cultural betrayal, and "[e]normous pressure is... put on women insiders
to relinquish their individual citizenship rights and to demonstrate group
loyalty by accepting the standard interpretation of group doctrine as the
only correct reading of their group's tradition."" Women are trapped,
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-9:275.1 (West 2000).
10. The phenomena at stake here are complex, and not easily summarized; for a fuller
explanation in addition to SHACHAR, supra note 3, see also especially Ayelet Shachar, Group
Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J.
POL. PHIL. 285 (1998) [hereinafter Shachar, Perils]; Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlock-
ing Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 385 (2000); Ayelet Shachar, Reshaping the Cultural Model: Group Accommodation and
Individual Rights, 8 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 83 (1998).
11. SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 35.
12. Id. at 35-36.
13. Id. at 39-40.
14. See id. at 60.
15. Id. at 39.
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unable to improve their situation from inside the group, unable to go to
outsiders for help, and usually financially, emotionally, and skills-wise
unable to leave, even if they would want to desert their primary cultural
context.
Of all the nondominant cultural groups in a given situation, those in
a state of "reactive culturalism" are of greatest interest to Shachar be-
cause of the question of how government involvement is likely to affect
their female members.' 6 On the one hand, these are the groups that are
most likely to ask for explicit rights and exemptions from State law so as
to preserve their own traditional law, yet on the other hand these exemp-
tions may very well preserve the systematic maltreatment of certain
members (for Shachar's purposes, women) of the group.' 7 Thus, by at-
tempting to protect the rights of the minority as a group by granting the
group more legal autonomy, the State leaves those certain members even
more legally and socially vulnerable than they were before. Shachar calls
this the "paradox of multicultural vulnerability."' 8 Michael Walzer called
it the "motive ... not to free oneself from minority status ... but to ac-
quire (and then mistreat) minorities of one's own."' 9
In order to prevent the government, the group, or both from forcing
women to make emotionally wrenching and often pragmatically impos-
sible "your culture or your rights"" choices, Shachar suggests that the
government and the group negotiate a solution in which they share juris-
diction over a given area of law of interest to the group. The goal is to
get the government and the group to compete for the allegiance of vul-
nerable group members so that the parties "identify and defend only
those [S]tate accommodations which can be coherently combined with
the improvement of the position of traditionally subordinated classes of
16. Although policies directed at women may stem from government involvement with
family law, it is worth noting that involvement by any nontraditional group, such as develop-
ment projects for women led by local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), can in some
circumstances leave women subject to physical threats and ostracism. See, e.g., MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 82 (1999).
17. SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 2.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Michael Walzer, The New Tribalism, 39 DISSENT 164, 169 (1992).
20. See SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 63-71. This phrase describes the no-win situation in
which female members of religious groups find themselves when policy analysts, government
officials, and/or group members assume that cultural laws are immutable and that a woman
cannot seek relief from such rules while remaining a loyal member of the group. She must
choose either to remain an undissenting member of her culture or to opt out of the group in
order to assert her (government-granted) rights. Such a paradox ignores the malleability of
culture and identity, and the common existence of multiple interpretations of group rules. It
also potentially minimizes the practical and personal difficulties women would experience if




individuals within minority group cultures*"" In turn, vulnerable group
members will experience increased bargaining power within their com-
munities, and hopefully group members will interpret cultural law in a
22more egalitarian way.
This feat of political science is called "transformative accommoda-
tion," and Shachar describes three preconditions for making it work. The
first principle is that all areas of law are divisible into "submatters" that
must be addressed together in order for a problem to be solved (e.g.,
contract interpretation and damages; or substantive law, criminal proce-
dure, and sentencing); the hope is that the group and the State may be
most interested in utterly different submatters.2' Next is the "no monop-
oly" rule: The group and the State each take jurisdiction over different
submatters, so that neither has complete control over the legal area at





between the government and the group when neither has a legal strong-
hold. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for lawyers and advocates
on the ground, both government and group must provide multiple oppor-
tunities in the life cycle of the law for group members to choose one
side's legal options over the other's. Such opportunities need not be of-
fered frequently, but they "cannot be taken lightly."26 The goal here is to
allow group members to opt out of aspects of group law, when that law is
untenable, without having to leave the group entirely, which is often nei-
ther desirable nor practically feasible.27
Most of Multicultural Jurisdictions focuses on transformative ac-
commodation in the context of family law,28 since family law describes
who falls within and without the boundaries of the group's influence,
and thus groups "increasingly demand legal recognition of family law
traditions as necessary to preserve the group's identity."'9 Family law is,
of course, also the means by which traditional roles and rights for
21. Id. at 118.
22. Id. at 138-40.
23. Id. at 119-20.
24. Id. at 120-22.
25. Id. at 119.
26. Id. at 123; see id. at 122-26.
27. Id. at 125 n.18.
28. An appendix describes briefly how the principles of transformative accommodation
might operate in the spheres of immigration, education, and criminal law. Id. at 151-65.
29. Id. at 46. Another interpretation of the common minority group emphasis on family
law is that those who find it necessary to compromise culturally with outsiders during the day
in the public realm compensate at home by protecting and glorifying to new heights the wives
and mothers who stay in the private realm away from such influences. This, in turn, feeds back
into the "women as symbol" problem. See TOVE STANG DAHL, THE MUSLIM FAMILY: A
STUDY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ISLAM 62-63 (Ronald Walford trans., 1997); supra notes 10-
15 and accompanying text.
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women can become concretized. ° Shachar identifies two submatters of
family law. The first is its "demarcating" element, which defines how
one is included or excluded from the group through marriage or descent,
with emphasis on the "racial, ethnic, biological and territorial" as op-
posed to the "cultural and spiritual."3' The second submatter is the
"distributive" component of family law, primarily involving property
division at divorce and death, "which shapes and allocates rights, duties,
and ultimately powers between men and women within the group. 32 She
suggests that the government and the group can negotiate as to which
each prefers to control, while providing opt-out provisions at strategic
points along the way.
The principles presented in Shachar's book are innovative and care-
fully developed, although they require that groups and governments
muster up considerable trust and political will to cooperate fully. Multi-
cultural Jurisdictions is thus likely to be of great interest to minority and
women's rights activists, as well as those interested in merging tradi-
tional or religious law with the civil law of the modern State. Although
many important issues relating to women's rights in the family have been
addressed by international human rights bodies and would make fine
complements to Shachar's book, this Review will explore several institu-
tional questions about how transformative accommodation relates to
international human rights law, in keeping with the institutional focus of
Multicultural Jurisdictions. The first of these questions is whether a
scheme that grants minority groups limited autonomy for autonomy's
sake is justifiable under international human rights law, and whether
such devolution of authority effectively insulates the actions of such
groups from international review. I will argue that transformative ac-
commodation is designed with a worst-case human rights scenario in
mind, such that some stretching may be necessary of the concepts
through which the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) protects cultural rights, and that international review of actions
taken in such groups is permissible under the jurisprudence of the
ICCPR Human Rights Committee. The second major question is
whether granting minority groups limited power to decide disputes re-
lated to family law status or property rights activates the State's
responsibility to ensure that such decisions occur in independent and
impartial tribunals with equality before the law. The short answer here is
yes, and States can comply either through direct supervision of group
30. SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 50.
31. Id. at 51 (quoting Hedva Ben-Israel, Nationalism in Historical Perspective, 45 J.
INT'L AFF. 367, 393 (1992)).
32. Id. at 50-51.
[Vol. 24:241
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courts or by providing review of group decisions in national courts. The
third section of this paper begins to address the question of how national
courts can review such decisions- in a way likely to respect the gender
equality and cultural -rights involved.
Shachar has produced a highly thought-provoking book that seeks to
inspire solutions to a frustrating and all-too-common problem; it is
worthwhile reading for any lawyer or activist in the field, whether reac-
tive culturalism is her particular albatross or not.
I. ICCPR ARTICLE 27: THE RIGHT OF MEMBERS OF MINORITIES
TO ENJOY THEIR CULTURES, LANGUAGES, AND RELIGIONS
Although Shachar's book is, broadly described, about the rights of
female members of minorities, significant portions are dedicated to dis-
cussing family law since it is the area in which groups most commonly
demand accommodation. The implication is that groups will probably be
most interested in its demarcating function: "Family law's peculiar
power lies not so much in its delineation of 'blood' membership as in its
value as a political expression of the group's power to determine its
(non-territorial) membership boundaries, i.e. a self-defined legal proce-
dure for autonomously demarcating who falls inside and outside the
collective."33 Yet the most widely ratified human rights treaty addressing
that issue, the ICCPR, article 27, does not protect the nuts and bolts of
minority family law per se, the "racial, ethnic, biological and territorial,"
but instead protects the "cultural and spiritual":3 4 Persons "shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language."35
33. Id. at 54 (citation omitted). Although Shachar does not suggest that cultural groups
enjoy an absolute right to define their own membership, this claim has been made at the inter-
national level on behalf of indigenous groups, although not for merely minority groups. For
indigenous groups: While the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries, June 27, 1989, art. I(a), 72 I.L.O. Official Bull. 59, does not specify a full
right for self-determined personal status laws, the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.I (1994), recognizes a "collective right to determine their own
citizenship in accordance with their customs and traditions" (art. 32), as well as a right of
indigenous peoples to retain their traditional legal systems (art. 4). For minority groups, see
the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Lin-
guistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 210,
U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1993) (no explicit right of minorities to determine own membership).
34. Ben-Israel, supra note 31.
35. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at 375-76.
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This Part will discuss the overriding interest of article 27 of the
ICCPR, which is also the underlying interest of transformative accom-
modation: protecting the ability of minority members to identify
themselves as part of the minority group (without unacceptably high
costs to the individual). The division of jurisdiction along submatter
lines does not result in the abdication of the State's duties toward group
members under international law. However, the transformative accom-
modation strategy is conceived only in terms of the local and national;
the various group, State, and nongovernmental players of international
law will have to consider carefully how international human rights re-
porting and adjudication will fit into the mix.
A. The Lovelace Case
Lovelace v. Canada36 was the first major ICCPR article 27 decision
of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR.3 7 It is notable for two things: its emphasis on what will be
called here the "relational" benefits of minority culture (rather than the
culture's legal traditions), and its holding that restrictions on group
membership must comply with the rest of the ICCPR. The ICCPR seeks
to defend individuals directly and to protect minorities' ways of living,
not to protect the abilities of groups to protect themselves. In contrast,
Shachar's suggestion is to give groups significant powers of self-
government in order to prove that cultural lockdown is unnecessary for
group preservation, a process that is at odds with the orientation toward
individual equality found in the ICCPR. This is therefore the aspect of
Shachar's work that is most likely to raise objections from international
human rights advocates. It is also possible, however, to argue that reac-
tive culturalism represents the exceptional situation where the values of
the human rights regime will have to be vindicated through long-term
strategies rather than fruitless and divisive, albeit direct, struggle. Love-
lace is a useful case for examining the validity of this argument.
Sandra Lovelace was registered as a member of the Maliseet Indian
tribe at her birth, but lost her tribal membership when she married a non-
Indian pursuant to section 12(l)(b) of Canada's former Indian Act, a
provision which applied to women and not to men. The Indian Act
sought to emulate a patrilineal structure supposedly found in all of
36. Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 13th
Sess., in Selected Decisions Under the Optional Protocol, at 83, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l
(1985).
37. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar.
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
[Vol. 24:241
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Canada's Native American groups, and was not specific to the Maliseet.38
After Lovelace's divorce she wished to return to the reserve where she
had grown up and where her parents still lived, but she was denied the
legal right to do so because she no longer had Indian status. Therefore,
under the Indian Act she was no longer permitted to reside upon, own,
possess, inherit, or be buried on the lands of her former tribe; to receive
federal loans, farming instruction, medical care, or due-free timber avail-
able only to Indians; or to exercise any traditional hunting or fishing
rights she may once have had. 9
However, the primary denial of a benefit of Maliseet membership
that concerned the Committee, and Lovelace's primary complaint, was
that "a person ceasing to be an Indian [loses] the cultural benefits of liv-
ing in an Indian community, the emotional ties to home, family, friends
and neighbours, and the loss of identity. 4° The Committee also specified
the loss of "access to her native culture and language."4 The Committee
decided that most of the distributive aspects of tribal membership
granted by the federal government listed above were beyond its review
because their content fell outside the scope of the Covenant.4 2 Neverthe-
less, the Committee insisted on protecting Lovelace's rights to culture,
language, and identity. It did so by inferring her right to live on her
community's reserve; because article 27 specifies that minority members
shall enjoy language, culture, and religion "in community with other
members of the group," and because "there is no place outside the To-
bique Reserve where such a community exists,, 43 Lovelace must be
allowed to live on the reserve, even if this meant changing the Indian
Act's demarcational rules. This was not a finding of a violation of the
right to freedom of movement and choice of residence44 per se, 4' but in-
stead a practical recognition of the peculiar nature of article 27: While
the right to participate in one's culture inheres in individuals, one cannot
speak one's language or tell one's stories alone 6
38. KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 362
(2002).
39. Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 36, 9.9.
40. Id.[ 13.1.
41. Id.[ 15.
42. Id. IT 14, 15.
43. Id. [ 15.
44. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 12(1)-(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176, 6 I.L.M. at 372.
45. See Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 36, 1[ 16, 18.
46. See Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, (Dis)Embedded Women, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L.
227 (2002). Whether article 27 ought to protect the rights of individuals or groups is some-
times disputed. See, e.g., William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the
Path to Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in
Indian Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 559 n.34 (2000) (stating that the Commit-
tee's article 27 jurisprudence is "confused" because sometimes groups are allowed the power
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Rather than protecting the right of the community to have its cultural
law enshrined in national or local public law, to determine what such law
should be, or Lovelace's right to challenge such law, the Committee can
be said to have required Canada to amend the Indian Act in order to pro-
tect Lovelace's one-way "relational" right: to relate to others as a
Maliseet Indian. The Committee saw Lovelace's Indian status as inherent
in her person and subject only to her wish to express it: "Persons who
are born and brought up on a reserve, who have kept ties with their
community and wish to maintain those ties must normally be considered
as belonging to that minority within the meaning of the Covenant. 47 The
Committee did not directly delve into the Maliseet's demarcational law,
the Canadian government's interpretation thereof, nor the distributional
law that followed; in fact, it sidestepped the colonial issue altogether and
superficially accepted that the government might want to define group
members for the purpose of protecting resources and group identity, 48 an
to expel their members, but sometimes not, and that "[some] Indian feminists stress[] ... that
the power of the tribe to determine its membership [is] a primary constituent of sovereignty").
However, the drafters of article 27 described the right as inhering in individuals because of a
historical belief that rights inhered in individuals and not groups; because with the exception
of article I on self-determination, the ICCPR creates a structure that protects only individual
rights; and most importantly, because they wished to preserve for individuals the ability to
choose to what degree they might assimilate with the majority. FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, SPE-
CIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC,
RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 206-10 (1979). "[T]he rights provided are based
on the interests of a collectivity, and consequently it is the individual as a member of a minor-
ity group, and not just any individual, who is destined to benefit from the protection granted
by article 27." Id. T 210.
47. Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 36, 14.
48. Id. T 15. The tension between ethnicity, colonialism, and the State action issue
inherent in the Indian Act; equality rights between men and women; and the subjective and
objective components of group identity are hinted at but not fully developed in the
Committee's ruling in Lovelace. The Committee first noted that article 27 only protects
members of minorities, and that pursuant to the Indian Act Sandra Lovelace was no longer a
member of the Maliseet. The Committee therefore ruled that group membership for the
purpose of applying article 27 had to be distinguished from membership for the purpose of the
Indian Act. It did so by implying that the Indian Act served primarily to describe those
distributional benefits flowing from Indian tribal membership as a result of tribal relations
with the State, apparently a matter very different from determining Lovelace's Indian status
for the purpose of determining whether she was being denied the opportunity to participate in
her culture more generally. The Committee then applied its own unspecified criteria for
determining personal group identity, summed up as a combination of her ostensibly objective
ethnicity and her subjectively experienced short separation from the tribe, to determine that
Lovelace was a member of the group for the purpose of article 27. Id. T 14. For further
discussion of the colonialism problem and these objectie and subjective elements, see KNOP,
supra note 38, at 358-72. For an argument that the Lovelace case was really about gender
rights and that the article 27 discussion is a means of evading the fact that the ICCPR was not
in effect in Canada when Lovelace was ejected from the Maliseet as a result of her marriage,
[Vol. 24:241
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argument to which it would later return when defining the limited cir-
cumstances under which protecting the group's identity might mean
denying the relational rights of otherwise worthy individuals 9
This leads to an important difference between the technique of the
ICCPR and Shachar's concept of transformative accommodation: While
the goals of each are very similar, their means of achieving those goals
can be seen as the inverse of each other. The ICCPR seeks, at its broad-
est, to achieve "the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want,"50 and article 27 itself
is "directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of
the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned."5 '
In other words, the ICCPR pursues the end of cultural freedom by pro-
tecting linguistic, cultural, and religious displays directly, rather than
protecting the group's right to protect itself. 2 Along these lines, Shachar
cites various aspects of the multicultural literature to show that the goal
of multiculturalism is to spread the benefits of a seemingly neutral gov-
ernment, which usually reflects the image of the majority, to members of
nondominant groups who might otherwise be insecure in their govern-
ment's ability and will to respond to their needs and views. 3 As Robert
Howse and Karen Knop put it,
the protection of cultural identity and affiliation may plausibly be
conceived of as vital to the autonomous flourishing of the
individual, to the individual's free and equal participation in the
common public culture. Deprived of her own language and
cultural community as a living context for political, social, and
artistic discourse, the individual senses herself neither particularly
free nor equal as a citizen of the greater community where another
language and/or culture predominates 4
While Shachar's goal of protecting minority rights thus appears to be
quite similar to that of the ICCPR, Shachar does not protect cultural dis-
plays or relationships directly but instead gives the group itself almost
see Anne F. Bayefsky, The Human Rights Committee and the Case of Sandra Lovelace, 20
CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 244 (1982).
49. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
50. ICCPR, supra note 1, pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 6 I.L.M. at 368.
51. General Comment No. 23, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., 9, in Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bod-
ies, at 38, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I1/Rev.I (1994).
52. See supra note 46.
53. SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 22-25.
54. Robert Howse & Karen Knop, Federalism, Secession, and the Limits of Ethnic
Accommodation: A Canadian Perspective, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 269, 278-79 (1992) (citation
omitted).
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unlimited license to determine its own demarcational or distributive law,
without democratic safeguards, in exchange for State control over the
other half of family law plus limited opt-out provisions for group mem-
bers too overburdened to continue under the group's system.
Should this qualitatively different approach be a problem for interna-
tional rights activists? Shachar's institutional solution, while designed to
avoid devolving too much power to the group, might stir political mo-
mentum toward undue future accommodations more difficult to control.
Moreover, it is easy to question why activists should throw their weight
behind a series of minority rights that are not clearly supported in inter-
national human rights law. In response, Shachar's protection of minority
rights seems to flow directly from her assessment of "reactive cultural-
ism" as a political crisis; the group gets limited group autonomy only as
a trade-off for protecting women's financial and relational autonomy
and, one suspects, only where no other solution is forthcoming. Activists
can certainly identify with such a concern, because the cultural differ-
ence argument is one that often wins out in local contexts.
International human rights advocates who are concerned about
Shachar's suggestion that group rights be recognized in their own right
are thus likely to point to the other major result of Lovelace, which is
that the Committee, having determined that residence on the Tobique
Reserve was necessary to preserve Lovelace's right to participate in her
cultural and linguistic community, formulated the following test to de-
termine that Canada's demarcational and distributive rules under the
Indian Act were improper: "[S]tatutory restrictions affecting the right to
residence on a reserve of a person belonging to the minority concerned,
must have both a reasonable and objective justification and be consistent
with the other provisions of the Covenant, read as a whole.,,15 "[C]onsis-
tent with the other provisions of the Covenant" would seem to suggest
that States Parties to the ICCPR have a responsibility to refrain from
validating customary law where contradictions between the two are
prominent, for instance where only one gender is allowed to initiate a
divorce or where children can be married irrevocably at a very young
age. Shachar does seem to support some baseline requirements for rec-
ognition of a demarcational scheme, for instance, where children's rights
and minimum ages for marriage are concerned.56 In the short term, under
transformative accommodation's limited opt-out provisions, women
should theoretically not have to suffer the imposition of discriminatory
55. Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 36, 1 16. It was duly declared that denial of resi-
dence on the reserve was not "reasonable, or necessary to preserve the identity of the tribe,"
and therefore that "to prevent her recognition as belonging to the band [was] an unjustifiable
denial of her rights." Id. T 17.
56. See, e.g., SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 47 n. 10, 109.
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law by the group unless they refuse to exercise that opt-out power. How-
ever, the primary long-term strategy of transformative accommodation
attempts to give women within minority groups enough power to cause
groups to reinterpret discriminatory law from within, rather than having
the State impose reform from without on an unwilling group-a plan
which most activists will recognize as a likely political disaster in a reac-
tive culturalist situation.
So is Shachar's system consistent with the Human Rights Commit-
tee's attitude toward cultural rights? Both are primarily concerned with
allowing minority group members access to their relational rights in the
short term; the difference is in the long-term strategy for achieving com-
pliance with the ICCPR. While a commitment to the international human
rights regime is attractive in part precisely because it aims to empower
the less powerful directly and immediately, there can be no denial that
sometimes situations do develop where this is politically impracticable.
Whether a given situation is likely to benefit from Shachar's transforma-
tive accommodation approach is ultimately a very local judgment to
make.
B. The Kitok Case
Aside from the question of whether defending individual cultural
rights by increasing group autonomy is legally defensible based on in-
ternational human rights law, another question that international human
rights activists may have about Shachar's system is whether devolving
half of family law (i.e., demarcational or distributional law) to the power
of potentially "private" groups would insulate it from review under the
ICCPR Optional Protocol for a lack of State action. If the State refuses
to interfere with a group's legal system, are individuals in the group cut
off from international review of their cases, and can the State avoid an-
swering questions about the group's practices when it makes its report to
the Human Rights Committee?57 Based on the case of Ivan Kitok,58 it
would appear not, but it does not follow that State measures that devolve
power in order to protect a minority are easily assailable. Where land or
other economic rights are directly at issue, the Committee seems likely
57. This question is made all the more tantalizing by the relatively recent coming into
force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, G.A. Re's. 54/4, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (vol. 1) (2000), under which the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women will hear individual complaints from women under
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
58. Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 33d
Sess., in Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 221, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988).
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to accept restrictions on access to groups, whether implemented primar-
ily by the State or the group itself.
Ivan Kitok brought his case to the Human Rights Committee after
Swedish courts refused to overturn the decision of a Sami ethnic com-
munity board that pursuant to section 12, paragraph 2 of the Reindeer
Husbandry Act, he was no longer eligible to herd reindeer in the com-
munity after failing to do so for three years. The law had been enacted in
order to limit the number of herders grazing reindeer on community
lands, so that traditional reindeer husbandry could be made profitable
enough to allow some ethnic Sami to earn a decent living entirely
through traditional ways of life, and the Swedish administrative adjudi-
cators were allowed to overturn a decision of a community board not to
grant reentry to a Sami member only in unspecified "special circum-
stances.'""9 Kitok protested his exclusion as a violation of his rights under
article 27; the Swedish government alleged that this was a private dis-
pute among the Sami and that any denial of Kitok's rights had not been
perpetrated by Sweden. The Committee responded that the passage of
the Reindeer Husbandry Act itself was sufficient to engage Sweden's
responsibility.60 In other words, the marshalling of distributive rules by
the State activated State responsibility for the group's demarcational de-
cisions.6'
Nonetheless, the Committee accepted Kitok's exclusion from the
formal rolls of Sami village members "for economic and ecological rea-
sons and to secure the preservation and well-being of the Sami
minority. '62 The Committee indicated that the case was a difficult and
close one, given the "objective ethnic criteria," Kitok's continuing links
with the community, and his efforts to return to reindeer farming as soon
as he was able to do so63-all factors very similar to Lovelace's case-
not to mention the distressing distinction between first-class and second-
class Sami inherent in the existence of differentiated Sami rights. The
Committee seems to have been won over by the distinctive reindeer hus-
bandry problem, however, as well as the fact that Kitok was informally
permitted to hunt, fish, and reside on Sami lands, and decided that the
59. Id. [ 2.2, 4.2.
60. id. T1 9.4.
61. The private-public acts distinction was further discredited as an acceptable defense
to article 27 complaints in the Committee's General Comment No. 23, supra note 51, 6.1:
"Positive measures of protection [of the rights granted in article 27] are ... required not only
against the acts of the State party itself, whether through its legislative, judlicial or administra-
tive authorities, but also against the acts of other persons within the State party." It would have
been helpful if the Committee had specified that this included challenges from members act-
ing within the minority group at issue, but this must be assumed from the text.
62. Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 58, 19.5.
63. Id. % 9.7.
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restriction at hand was "necessary for the continued viability and welfare
of the minority as a whole."6
It is difficult to explain the difference in results between Lovelace
and Kitok65 without emphasizing the economic aspects of the distinctive
way of life at stake in the latter case. Although in either of the cases the
influx of large numbers of new members onto group land could have
been economically and ecologically challenging for the minorities at
stake, the colonialist and gender-discriminatory Canadian Indian Act
apparently had less sentimental appeal than the protection of disappear-
ing Sami reindeer herders. Since Kitok, the Committee's interest in
protecting distinctive ways of life seems only to have increased, to the
extent that article 27 might now be said to protect language, religion,
culture, and agricultural/ecological systems.66 This is unsurprising; dis-
tinctive ways of life like reindeer herding fit neatly into the relational
rights concept protected under article 27, and when the Committee pro-
tects them it can be viewed as clearly promoting minority cultures, not
merely minority autonomy claims.
While protection of distinctive ways of life is thus consistent with
the history and purpose of article 27, it does illustrate how economic
pressures can affect the success of a given minority-protection project.
When only potentially inexpensive relational rights such as language are
the focus of cultural rights preservation, the group's future survival can
always be said to be promoted through the use of demarcational rules
that maximize the number of members of the group; more language
speakers equals more security in identity. This can be said to be good for
women; more security in identity equals less social pressure to behave in
ways thought to promote the group's uniqueness. However, Kitok shows
that when group membership requires use of finite group resources-
when more members means less grazing space per reindeer-restrictions
on behavior increase in order to protect those resources. Where there is
significant competition for communal economic resources, then demar-
cational policy (defining the group's members) and distributive policy
64. Id. $ 9.8.
65. See KNOP, supra note 38, at 370-71 & n.58. Knop points out that both Kitok and
Lovelace were permitted but not statutorily entitled to live on their groups' respective lands,
yet Kitok had a community board declaration allowing him to do so, Kitok v. Sweden, supra
note 58, $ 4.2, whereas Lovelace did not have full community support and "dissident members
of the tribe who support[ed] her cause [had] threatened to resort to physical violence in her
defence should the authorities attempt to remove her" Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 36,
$ 9.7. Also, the violation of Lovelace's right to gender equality as guaranteed by article 3 of
the ICCPR, supra note 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, must have weighed heavily on the
Committee even though it insisted that such a claim was barred as arising before the ICCPR
came into force in Canada. Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 36, $ 10.
66. See, e.g., General Comment No. 23, supra note 51, 1$ 3.2, 7.
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(determining the access each group member has to resources, including
power) must be fairly tightly coordinated. 6 ' Although this in no way in-
validates Shachar's system, it does suggest that transformative
accommodation will be easier to apply to, for instance, recent urban im-
migrant populations seeking accommodation in basic areas of family law
as opposed to indigenous groups with complex economic relations with
the State. Even more political will and good faith are required in negotia-
tions between the group, activists, and the State. Women's rights activists
may also question how much effort government negotiators can put into
protecting the position of women when land, water, mineral, and wildlife
concerns are also on the bargaining table; or, to put it another way, much
more may ultimately be involved in family law than personal status and
property rights.
International human rights activists need not fear that a transforma-
tive accommodation system will necessarily insulate intragroup
restrictions from international review. However, if restrictions can be tied
to the availability of distinctive resources or practices and are not other-
wise wildly violative of the ICCPR, they have a decent chance of being
upheld before the Committee. If access to resources is a significant part
of the reactive-culturalist group's set of concerns, international review
may be less helpful to women than would otherwise be the case.
If we accept, then, that transformative accommodation and the
ICCPR both ultimately seek to achieve short-term relational rights
protection and long-term gender equality, these two systems can be used
together. An interim cause for concern is that where efforts are being
made to implement a transformative accommodation system,
international human rights advocates may face pressure to avoid bringing
cases to the attention of the Human Rights Committee so as to maintain
political good will. Also, governments may feel compelled to defend
group actions more strenuously than they otherwise would, in order to
protect the arrangement. These are issues that require both advance
negotiation and good on-the-spot policymaking, as well as careful
vigilance by nongovernmental organizations. In other words, while
transformative accommodation can be compatible with improving
human rights situations via international human rights law, it probably
will not make the process any simpler.
67. See, e.g., R.L. v. Canada, Communication No. 358/1989, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43d
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/358/1989 (1991). In this case, the Whispering Pines Indian
Band, a cattle-raising subset of the Shuswap Nation of only twenty-six members, claimed to
be reeling from the amendments to the Indian Act that Canada made in light of the result in
Lovelace, which would have dramatically raised its number of middle-aged members while
disqualifying many of the members' children from membership. The communication was
declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Id.
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II. ICCPR ARTICLE I4: TRIAL BY AN INDEPENDENT
AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
While the cultural rights aspect of the ICCPR is the most obvious one
to discuss when assessing a book about minority rights from the perspec-
tive of international human rights law, a question that is just as important
is whether granting jurisdiction to a nongovernmental group to control
certain aspects of legal status like family law will lead to group courts and,
if so, whether there will be deviations from international standards for ad-
judication. Shachar does not discuss regulation of the sort of private group
courts which might determine demarcational or distributive family law
rights in Multicultural Jurisdictions,6 ' but it is fair to assume that some
groups, especially those with complex family law traditions and some his-
torical tradition of dispute resolution bodies, will want to designate
someone within the group to decide disputes when they arise. This Part
will analyze the question of whether such decision making is likely to be
subject to international human rights law, and whether institutions can be
devised which will successfully adhere to both the transformative accom-
modation and international human rights frameworks.
Article 14(1) of the ICCPR regulates civil adjudication as follows:
"All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the deter-
mination of ... his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."69 In courts created or endorsed
within a transformative accommodation situation, this raises the initial
question of how to determine whether a tribunal is competent, independ-
ent, and impartial without stepping on the toes of someone in the group,
since the Committee requires reporting on "the manner in which judges
are appointed, the qualifications for appointment, and the duration of
their terms of office; the condition governing promotion, transfer and
cessation of their functions and the actual independence of the judiciary
from the executive branch and the legislative."7° The initial questions,
however, are whether family law questions are covered by article 14(1)
and what kind of regulation is required for group-based institutions.
This Part will show that most issues of family demarcational and dis-
tributive law are of the type that the ICCPR requires to be adjudicated in
a court compliant with article 14(1). Shachar's system divides jurisdic-
tion along submatter lines in order to give groups control over certain
68. Shachar has discussed this possibility in works that predate Multicultural Jurisdic-
tions, especially Shachar, Perils, supra note 10. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
69. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176, 6 I.L.M. at 372.
70. General Comment No. 13, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 21st Sess. 3, in Compilation
of General Comments, supra note 51, at 14.
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aspects of their law, but it is a government's responsibility to ensure that
all courts within the State comply with the ICCPR. Whether this creates
a conflict may be a situation-specific issue, but if conflicts arise they can
only be resolved through careful negotiation and compromise. One an-
swer may be direct government review of a court's personnel, but not of
its decisions. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,7 United States Su-
preme Court Justice White suggested that a different answer could be
another submatter split, this time in appellate jurisdiction: Upon appeal,
the federal court can order that another decision and/or remedy be made,
but the group court decides what the decision and/or remedy will be.
72
Either way, family law cases require equality before courts that are com-
petent, independent, and impartial.
A. A "Suit at Law"
Most of article 14 of the ICCPR is devoted to criminal trials, but ar-
ticle 14(1) specifically requires equality before the courts in any kind of
case, and governs the independence and impartiality of courts that de-
termine both criminal cases and/or "suits at law." Article 14 is therefore
relevant to Shachar's book only if legal disputes about family law consti-
tute "suits at law." The problem is that "the cases do not provide a clear
definition of a 'suit at law.' ",7 While on the one hand the problem seems
to be confined to a question of whether or not a right is an exclusively
administrative one created by an elective relationship between the indi-
vidual and the State (which family law is not, leaving no question that
such cases are suits at law), on the other hand it is possible to argue that
a small case being argued in the nether regions of a nongovernment
group's private administration should not be analyzed as part of the State
court apparatus at all. This Section will show that any adjudication of
family law or group demarcational rights does constitute a "suit at law,"
and that the body deciding the suit must therefore conform to the re-
quirements of article 14.
The primary "suit at law" case is YL. v. Canada, which noted that
the "suit at law" concept was expressed differently in the five equally
authentic language texts of the Covenant 4 and that the drafting history
does not resolve this problem." The basic idea behind a suit at law is that
there needs to be an "organizational separation between the judiciary
71. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
72. Id. at 76 (White, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying note 92.
73. SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 282 (2000).
74. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 53(l), 999 U.N.T.S. at 186, 6 I.L.M. at 383.
75. Y.L. v. Canada, Communication No. 112/1981, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 40 9.1-2, at 145, U.N. Doc. A/41/40 (1986).
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and the administration.7 6 The principle established in YL. is that a "suit
at law" must be analyzed based on the nature of the right involved, rather
than the status of the parties (in which case a purely administrative right
would involve the government on one side) or the forum (in which case
the government might try to manipulate the outcome of a particular type
of case by insulating it in an administrative tribunal).77 In YL. the denial
of an army pension by an administrative body did not constitute a viola-
tion of article 14(1) where the denial could have been appealed through
Canada's regular courts.78 (Three members of the Committee, however,
felt that the military-State relationship underlying the pension was fun-
damentally different from a labor contract such that the case did not
constitute a suit at law.)79 The Committee has also found possible suits at
law in cases involving dismissal from the civil service, regulation of a
legal professional body, deportation proceedings, and determination of
social security benefits.80
The question at hand is whether any of the issues that might be given
to a cultural group to decide in a transformative accommodation system
would constitute suits at law, thus requiring an independent and impartial
tribunal. Where the case in issue is one of marital status or division of
property at divorce or death, this would clearly constitute a suit at law.
No government responsibilities are directly involved, and because
changes in marital and property status are generally required to be
registered with the State, "equality before the laws" demands that all
groups in the State be subject to this protection. The outcome is less
clear if the issue were more akin to that decided in Kitok (whether the
appellant was allowed to rejoin a Sami village for reindeer herding
purposes), because it is possible to argue that the rights at stake in
village membership involved access to certain federally protected land
and water rights granted only to segments of the population. This is an
issue closely connected with the State, the adjudication of which might
therefore resemble only an administrative decision. Broad readings of
"suit at law" have been advanced based on the result in YL.,8' however,
and the expectation of commentators seems to be that the Committee
will require an independent tribunal in most cases where "civil rights and
76. MANFRED NOWAK, CCPR COMMENTARY 241 (1993).
77. Y.L. v. Canada, supra note 75, 9.2.
78. Id. T 9.4-.5.
79. Id. 3.
80. JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 73, at 281-82.
81. E.g., D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 672 (5th ed.
1998); NOWAK, supra note 76, at 242.
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obligations 8 2 are decided. Because the question of minority group
membership exists independently of the State, article 14 is likely to
apply to adjudication of that question.
Since transformative accommodation would require groups to decide
and apply certain aspects of group law themselves, moreover, it is likely
that intragroup dispute resolution will become necessary at some point.
This means that groups will have to comply with ICCPR article 14(1) by
ensuring equality before the tribunals, a full and fair public hearing, and
a competent, independent, and impartial adjudicator. One way of
accomplishing this is for groups to work together with States to ensure
the equality of parties before traditional adjudicators, that adjudicators
are properly selected, educated, and trained, and that adjudicators are
insulated from group rule-making and rule-executing bodies. Where
group membership includes lawyers trained in the majority legal system
who also meet group requirements for holding authority positions,
volunteers acceptable to both sides may be easy to find. Indeed such
bicultural adjudicators could offer exciting possibilities for future
transformation of group law if they do not themselves become subject to
reactive culturalist demands to protect the group's honor. Where groups
are more isolated, however, this would require a tremendous amount of
negotiation between a reactive-culturalist group and a State already
stressed from working out the details of the underlying demarcational/
distributional scheme, especially since groups with clearly defined courts
often like them the way they are. Indeed, traditional courts are perhaps
likely to be perceived as part of the group law package. Because the suit
at law requirement is deemed waived where a right of appeal to the
general courts exists, "3 the much easier option (at least initially) would
simply be to include such a provision in the transformative
accommodation requirement. Even this option, however, would need
conditions placed on its exercise in order to ensure that the true division
of jurisdiction along submatter lines remained substantive enough to be
politically convincing to the group. Very similar issues have been raised
in the U.S. Native American context, explored below.
82. NOWAK, supra note 76, at 242 (referring to article 6 of the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as being
similar to ICCPR article 14).
83. See Y.L. v. Canada, supra note 75, 1 9.4-5; HARRIS, supra note 81, at 672-73;
NOWAK, supra note 76, at 242.
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B. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and Group Court Review
814The case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez presents many of the
problems discussed above. The plaintiff was a Santa Claran woman who
had married a Navajo man and raised her children on the Santa Clara
Pueblo, where they "[spoke] the Tewa language, participate[d] in its life,
and [were], culturally, for all practical purposes, Santa Claran Indians."5
A brand-new tribal rule adopted two years before the marriage denied
tribal membership to the children of women, but not of men, who mar-
ried outside the tribe-not because of any internal patrilineal tradition
but because the experience of the group was that men, whether tribal
members or not, tended to dominate the cultural affiliation of mixed-
heritage families and the use of family-controlled land, which was of
paramount economic and cultural concern to the tribe.86 When presented
with the opposite result in the persons of Julia Martinez and her daughter
Audrey, the Santa Clara Pueblo Council, in which the legislative and
judicial powers of the group were vested,87 declined to change the rule,
which carried with it the full panoply of economic and civil conse-
quences . The United States Supreme Court chose to find the suit, which
was based on Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968,
barred by sovereign immunity as against the tribe, and barred by lack of
explicit statutory authorization of the suit against the Pueblo's officers.89
Part of what makes the case so interesting is that it describes a
number of methods of judicial review of tribal actions that Congress
84. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
85. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F.Supp. 5, 18 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd, 540 F.2d
1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
86. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
66-67 (1987). Apparently the rule was promulgated in response to the federal General Allot-
ment Act, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (2000), which "divided up communal lands into
individually held parcels," thus facilitating the appropriation of tribal lands by white men
marrying Native American women. Id. Though the Act did not apply to the Santa Clarans, they
nevertheless "recognized that Congress could apply it to them at any time." Id. at 66.
87. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 82 (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 52-53. Several times Natalie Martinez, a daughter of Julia Martinez deceased
at the time of trial, was denied emergency medical care for strokes she suffered during the
course of her final illness because of her lack of Santa Claran Indian status. Respondent's
Brief at 2-3, Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, cited in Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 721 (1989).
89. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59, 70. The Tenth Circuit had found that "since [the ICRA]
was designed to provide protection against tribal authority, the intention of Congress to allow
suits against the tribe was an essential aspect [of the ICRA]. Otherwise, it would constitute a
mere unenforceable declaration of principles." Martinez, 540 F.2d at 1042; see also Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (tribal authority does not spring from the Constitution, but Con-
gress has plenary authority to limit or modify local powers of self-government).
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considered, but discarded, while developing the ICRA.9° An early draft
of the ICRA included a provision that would have allowed de novo court
review of tribal decisions in criminal cases, and allowed the Attorney
General to receive, investigate, screen, and possibly pursue civil claims
against tribes in federal courts. It was also suggested that the Department
of the Interior could have retained administrative authority over civil
complaints arising on Native American reservations, with appellate
review in the district courts.9 Justice White seemed particularly to
support a proposal that tribal decisions be reviewed in federal courts
only with respect to whether the constitutional rights of the accused were
violated, with the appropriate remedy being either dismissal or remand
to the tribal court with instructions to find a constitutionally acceptable
solution to the problem.92 Appellate review was broken down into the
submatters, so to speak, of whether relief is appropriate and what the
relief should be. This system would be considerably less intrusive and
resource-consuming than de novo review, and would allow unique
cultural problems to continue to be solved by tribes instead of federal
courts, so long as such solutions could pass minimal constitutional
muster. This sounds similar to the limited appeal in special
circumstances that was available in Kitok, but in this case the ultimate
remedy would be shaped by the group itself rather than by the reviewing
court.
There are two major points of comparison between White's institu-
tional solution and national government supervision of the independence
and impartiality of tribal courts: White's solution would comply with the
article 14 requirements of the ICCPR with far less day-to-day interfer-
ence by the government in group courts, but it also might require more
interpretive creativity by group judges in the future, which groups could
experience as ongoing interference jeopardizing the health of the trans-
formative accommodation system. At any rate, White's proposal could
be easier to negotiate. Shachar generally rejects systems that depend on
federal appeal from group bodies for protection of individual rights.93
90. The legislative history of the ICRA showed that many Senators supported some
form of federal review of tribal court decisions in civil cases. They were supported by some
Native Americans who testified that power-hungry local governors were violating individual
rights with no possibility of redress, yet "bitterly opposed" by tribal leaders who felt that de
novo review by the District Courts would lead to huge intrusions into tribal authority. Marti-
nez, 436 U.S. at 66-69; id. at 79-82 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, who dissented in
the case, pointed out that "[t]he extension of constitutional rights to individual citizens is in-
tended to intrude upon the authority of government," id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting), but
apparently that was thought to be neither here nor there.
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id. at 76 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Shachar, Perils, supra note 10, at 298.
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She makes the very good point that such structures place too much re-
sponsibility on a group member already burdened by a difficult legal and
social situation to take the initiative to file an appeal, although she also
suggests that such burdens can be mitigated by granting amicus status to
governmental or nongovernmental bystanders.94 Her other concern with
appeals to government courts is that groups are unlikely to agree to a
system in which they have no control over what happens to cases on ap-
peal.9 White's system is somewhat responsive to this concern, and other
governmental limitations could be drawn up as well that might assure
groups that their most important concerns will be taken into account.
Family law is, as Shachar recognizes, some of the most critical law
in people's lives. As such its adjudication must meet the standards set out
in ICCPR article 14(1) for equality before competent, impartial, and in-
dependent tribunals. In some situations, especially where interest in
compliance with international human rights law is weak, compliance
with article 14 in a transformative accommodation system imposes an
extra layer of institutional finesse that may not be politically desirable to
the group or the government. But where activists and governments are
dedicated to observing the international human rights rule of law, care-
fully crafted review of minority group adjudication is a necessary and
important component of the negotiation of a transformative accommoda-
tion scheme.
III. GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF GROUP ADJUDICATION:
THE SULLIVAN FRAMEWORK
If, as suggested in Part II, it becomes necessary for government
courts or administrators to perform limited review of group decisions
made in the context of a transformative accommodation institutional
agreement, undoubtedly the agreement itself will specify certain policy
concerns and ideals that the government courts or administrators will
consider in the particular case of the group at hand. This section will
briefly discuss general issues that government courts or administrators
will need to keep in mind, including awareness of traditional majority
values, consideration of how the structure of adjudication may distort the
assertion of group-related rights, and the jurisprudence of the Committee
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This
section will also briefly suggest that the framework put forward by
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religious rights96 could offer a starting point for negotiations between
groups and governments about foundational values to be considered
whenever a government reviews a group court. These are only starting
points, but they are important ones.
The first, and most elementary, point is that constitutional or other
civil rights protections developed in the majority's legal tradition, espe-
cially through a long lineage of common law precedent, are usually
highly contextual, even though adjudicators may not think of them as
such. They shape and are shaped by majority values and ideals and are
not always appropriate for wholesale application. to minority groups, no
matter how frequently applied in the majority setting.97 They need not
always be abandoned entirely, but attention to legal history can help to
separate necessarily applicable principles from mere traditions.
A second point is that the architecture of the conflict the court is
called upon to discuss may be quite complex, first in terms of its intrin-
sic structure based on who the parties are, and secondly on the basis of
the rights the parties may have to assert. A useful case for visualizing
these problems is the infamous Shah Bano case,9 in which the Supreme
Court of India upheld a ruling of alimony to be paid by a Muslim man to
his seventy-three-year-old wife of forty-three years under a criminal
statute aimed at preventing indigence. The husband had divorced her
precisely so that he would not have to pay her long-term maintenance,
which is recommended but not required under classical Muslim law.99
Adjudication tends to be fundamentally bilateral, flattening out the inter-
ests at stake when only two of three necessary actors are present.,°°
Shachar calls this split in interests and jurisdiction-between the indi-
vidual group member asserting her right, the group claiming shelter
96. Sullivan, supra note 2.
97. Obvious examples in the U.S. context would include tests for whether a measure is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977), both of which are considered basic standards for adjudicating individual constitu-
tional rights.
98. Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 556 (India).
99. Although certainly not customary in Indian practice, even one of the most vocal
opponents of the Shah Bano court victory framed the problem as whether what Islam recom-
mended as good and desirable could be mandated by the secular State. Syed Shahabuddin, The
Turmoil in the Muslim Mind, ONLOOKER, Mar. 16-31, 1985, at 32, 34, quoted in Zakia Pathak
& Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, "Shahbano", 14 SIGNs 558, 564 (1989). The judgment was met
with "mass demonstrations, strikes, and petitions presented by Muslims calling for a reversal
of the judgment, which was seen [by some Muslims] as violating Muslim Personal Law."
Amrita Chhachhi, Forced Identities: The State, Communalism, Fundamentalism, and Women
in India, in WOMEN, ISLAM, AND THE STArE 144, 146 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991).
100. See SHACHAR, supra note 3, at 27; Shachar, Perils, supra note 10, at 286-87.
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under a communal policy (even though the commune may be internally
divided over the issue), and the State-a "trichotomy."' 0'
In the Shah Bano case, the State sued the ex-husband for nonsupport;
only the interests of the conservative Muslim community member and the
State were balanced; and Shah Bano herself receded into the background
as the State and the (unappointed) group representative defended its
response to her needs as each saw them. The internal conflict among
Muslims along class and theology lines, the effect of the Muslim-Hindu
conflict on the terms of the debate, and Shah Bano's identity beyond that
of the generic Muslim female were not represented in court, leaving the
court to reconstruct these interests as best it could, and leaving Shah
Bano vulnerable to bitter recrimination outside the courtroom. Moreover,
because Muslims in India have religiously-based personal status laws but
are not accorded any other judicially protected minority status, the ex-
husband's communal claim was easily collapsed into a mere balancing
of the individual right to religious conscience as against the State. Yet
group claims based on religious traditions are not necessarily the same
as freedom of conscience rights; the individual who makes a claim
against the group is often asserting an interpretation of a rule that enjoys
considerable support within the group, and the State's interest in
promoting equality between its citizens may be wholly irrelevant to the
parties involved. Courts must be careful not to mix their parties or their
rights, and it may be difficult to get all the information necessary to
understand what the issues are in the case. Liberal amicus and third-
party intervention rules, among others, can help alleviate these problems,
but may not solve them entirely.
A third point of reference for the State committed to upholding its
international human rights obligations is that many of the aspects of fam-
ily law that are likely to arise in a family law transformative
accommodation scheme have been analyzed by the Committee of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.' °2 The Committee's rulings are useful whether the issue arises
directly before a national court or on appeal from a group court. Because
the State is most likely to control the distributive aspects of family law in
Shachar's system, the major decisions on property division at divorce are
summarized here. Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (not to mention
article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 3 and article 23
101. Shachar, Perils, supra note 10, at 287.
102. See CEDAW, supra note 57, arts. 17-22, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 21-22.
103. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
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of the ICCPR' °4) requires States to take all appropriate measures to elimi-
nate gender discrimination "in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations," including measures to guarantee equal rights during marriage
and at its dissolution (article 16(c)), and equal rights regarding property
(article 16(h)).' 5 In paragraph 30 of the CEDAW Committee's General
Recommendation Number 21 106 on equality in marriage and family rela-
tions, the Committee rejects the idea of entirely separate property
altogether, advocating instead a mixing of spousal property acquired
during marriage. The reason is stated in paragraph 32: "[S]uch
contributions of a non-financial nature [as household duties and caring
for elderly relatives and children] by the wife enable the husband to earn
an income and increase the assets. Financial and non-financial contribu-
tions should be accorded the same weight [in determining contributions
to marital property]."'0 7 In addition, paragraph 28 rejects the idea that
divorced women are to be supported by male relatives:
Any discrimination in the division of property that rests on the
premise that the man alone is responsible for the support of the
women and children of his family and that he can and will hon-
ourably discharge this responsibility is clearly unrealistic.
Consequently, any law or custom that grants men a right to a
greater share of property at the end of a marriage ... is dis-
criminatory and will have a serious impact on a woman's
practical ability to divorce her husband, to support herself or her
family and to live in dignity as an independent person."'
General Recommendation Number 21 was developed in honor of
1994 as the International Year of the Family, and makes pointed refer-
ence to multiple instruments that enshrine rights to equality within
marriage,' °9 so the above is potentially relevant even to nations that have
not ratified CEDAW. Courts should remember that cultural laws on
property distribution are usually operating outside their native context in
104. lCCPR, supra note 1, art. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at 375.
105. CEDAW, supra note 57, art. 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20.
106. General Recommendation No. 21, CEDAW Comm., 13th Sess. T 30, in Compila-
tion of General Comments, supra note 5 1, at 90.
107. Id. 1 32.
108. Id. 28.
109. Id. T 2 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 103; 1CCPR,
supra note 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171, 6 L.L.M. at 368; Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women, Aug. 11, 1958, 309 U.N.T.S. 65; Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, Dec. 9, 1964, 521 U.N.T.S. 231; Nairobi For-
ward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, Report of the World Conference to
Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women, July 15-26,
1985, U.N. Sales No. E.85.IV. 10).
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a transformative accommodation situation, and should not defer to group
tradition where there is reason to think that modifying a rule is likely to
increase the effectiveness of its policy.
Fourth, States that need to review minority-court actions for possible
national rights violations need an appropriate framework for assessing
the rights and policies asserted by individuals and group authorities. As
discussed above, the content of the transformative accommodation
agreement negotiated with the group will likely help 'to structure such
review. A useful starting point for such assessments is provided by
Donna Sullivan, who has developed a framework for analyzing women's
equality rights and religious claims. She offers a complex balancing pro-
cedure that is worth quoting in full:
One of the primary factors to be considered is the relationship
between the specific equality right at issue and the overarching
goal of gender equality. A second factor, conversely, is the im-
portance of the religious law or practice to the right of religious
freedom upon which it is premised. Assessments of the signifi-
cance of a religious practice should proceed from the
significance accorded that practice by the religion or belief it-
self. A third factor to be analyzed is the degree to which each
practice infringes the other or the underlying rights and interests.
In other words, does the conflict result in only a slight degree of
interference, or is either of the practices totally barred and the
exercise of the underlying rights extensively restricted or fore-
closed? A fourth factor to be considered is whether other human
rights are implicated. For example, if the religion in question is
one practiced by a minority group, the impact of the proposed
restrictions on the rights of minorities under article 27 of the Po-
litical Covenant must be taken into account. Fifth, if religious
law imposes a series of limitations on women's rights, their cu-
mulative effect on women's status should be weighed, as should
the effect of multiple restrictions of religious practice on the re-
ligion concerned. Finally, where the state has determined that
restriction of a religious law or practice is necessary for the pur-
pose of ensuring women's rights under [CEDAW] or general
guarantees of gender equality, the proportionality of the restric-
tion must be assessed.' 0
This approach is particularly useful in the transformative accommo-
dation setting because it strives to synthesize gender, religious, and
minority claims, in keeping with the supposedly "universal, indivisible,
110. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 821-23 (citations omitted).
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and interdependent and interrelated" character ascribed to the totality of
human rights."' Equally important is the "anti-essentialist"/"cross-
cultural" approach to gender, which is important to avoiding inappropri-
ate generalizations from the majority to the minority about what women
need."1
2
Sullivan's framework can be compressed somewhat to fit the trans-
formative accommodation situation, and other situation-specific issues
could be added to this list. One means by which the factors could be ex-
plained to the appellate court might be a pleading requirement in which
the parties are required to submit their assessments of how these factors
apply to the case at hand.
Sullivan's primary factor is "the relationship between the specific
equality right at issue and the overarching goal of gender equality."'" It
is worth noting that although not every restriction placed on women is
experienced as an important one, family law is one area in which most
specific equality rights are likely to have a significant impact on the
situation of women overall. Sullivan's second factor, the importance of
the particular law or practice to the adherent's right of cultural and/or
religious freedom; the third factor, the degree of interference in that
right; and the last factor, the proportionality of the restriction, place spe-
cial emphasis on the content of the culture as opposed to the group's
autonomy rights. This is necessary given the values expressed in ICCPR
article 27, but is likely to be a point of some contention, given that while
the whole point of transformative accommodation is to encourage the
group to amend discriminatory practices from within, the aim of judicial
review at this stage of the litigation is to determine whether the group
must be told to develop an acceptable remedy by changing a practice.
This may need to be a special point of negotiation with the group; for
instance, the group may wish to explain how the practice should be un-
derstood in light of the group's planning to ensure its future survival. The
fourth step in Sullivan's analysis reminds us that cultural, linguistic, reli-
gious, and ecological rights can and sometimes should be analyzed
separately, because their costs and effects can vary widely. The fifth as-
pect of Sullivan's framework, the cumulative effect upon women of
multiple restrictions imposed by religious law, and the cumulative effect
upon religion of restrictions imposed on its own law, reminds the adjudi-
cator to avoid myopic analysis of practices without holistic reference to
the entire social context. Overall, Sullivan's framework for adjudicating
111. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, in Report of the World Conference
on Human Rights, pt. 1 5, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (1993).
112. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialisn. Relativism, and Human Rights, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 119-20 (1996).
113. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 821-22.
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conflicts between religious and gender rights shows how difficult human
rights problems can be approached with respect for the complexity of the
issues involved, without forcing participants to choose among aspects of
their personal identities or to mischaracterize their needs in order to have
their rights vindicated.
National court review of group court decisions, or, for that matter,
national court adjudication of group rights claims in the first instance, is
likely to be politically contentious and possibly bewildering for the ad-
judicators involved. To start from the premises listed above-analyzing
whether majority legal traditions are appropriately applied to the group,
careful attentiveness to parties and rights that are difficult to represent in
the. majority legal culture, familiarity with the precedents of the CEDAW
Committee, and a preliminary examination of the Sullivan factors in
every case-would not only be useful for the court but would also signal
its good faith to the group involved. ICCPR article 14(1) need not be a
barrier to the successful development of a transformative accommoda-
tion system, but, like everything else in the international human rights
regime, it must be considered and implemented carefully.
CONCLUSION
Multicultural Jurisdictions describes so beautifully a problem so
destructive and so frequently encountered-the holding hostage of
women by their communities in the name of group uniqueness-that it is
difficult not to fault Shachar for not solving every manifestation of the
problem. While the book will be of great interest to women's rights
activists dealing with the cultural difference argument, Shachar's
institutional solutions to the reactive-culturalist problem were not
designed to apply in other, equally depressing contexts. For instance,
sometimes the problem is that demanding strict adherence to cultural law
makes it easy for elders to claim that marriages are invalid where
complex wedding traditions, which can take years to concretize, break
down because of urbanization, migration, colonialism, and transitions
from agricultural to cash economies. ' 14 Even if a reactive-culturalist
situation is at work here, transformative accommodation cannot turn
back the clock, nor would we want it to. Also, there is no real solution to
the problem posed in, for instance, South Africa, where a new
constitution pledging to protect equality on the basis of, inter alia, race,
114. See Andrew P. Kult, Note, Intestate Succession in South Africa: The "Westerniza-
tion" of Customary Law Practices Within a Modern Constitutional Framework, 1I IND. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REV. 697, 710-11 (2001).
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gender, marital status, ethnic origin, culture, and birth"5 was still not
used by courts to protect the inheritance rights of a daughter where the
denial thereof was the direct result of her being both supposedly
illegitimate and the daughter of a man of African descent." 6 These
situations do not involve the problem that Shachar is addressing.
The problem that Shachar is addressing is, it appears, one where
human rights law is not helpful because group leaders won't recognize it
and prevent women from taking advantage of it. Will human rights advo-
cates attempt to implement a transformative accommodation system in a
given situation? This will depend in part on how much they perceive the
necessity of a tacit admission that human rights law will not help to
change conditions on the ground in a particular case. Otherwise there is
considerable risk; what starts out as a limited departure from the way the
ICCPR protects minority rights, taken in the name of protecting women
in an unusual situation, could explode into other demands for protection
of the group's autonomy. This could be a big and unjustifiable step to
take, especially if a State has already committed under CEDAW to "take
all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish ex-
isting laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women."' 7 Of course, for many activists, interna-
tional human rights law is only one weapon in their arsenal, such that
departures like the ones necessitated by Shachar's approach are not a big
problem if ultimately the job gets done.
The other question is whether the concern with courts' compliance
with ICCPR article 14 would destroy the transformative accommodation
system from Shachar's perspective. Activists may feel that the measures
proposed here are not really enough to establish the equity of women," 8
but Shachar may also feel that the intrusion of appellate review of the
constitutionality of decisions undermines the division of jurisdiction to
the point of untenability. Perhaps, again, such departures are not a big
problem if ultimately the job gets done.
Therein lies the rub: Multicultural Jurisdictions offers a discerning
and innovative strategy for solving what seems like an intractable prob-
lem, but the outcome of the implementation is always uncertain. No
nation in the world has perfect international human rights law compli-
ance, and whether a transformative accommodation system can help
115. S. AFR. CONST. § 9(3).
116. Mthembu v. Letsela, 2000 (3) SA 867 (A).
117. CEDAW, supra note 57, art. 2(f), 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16.
118. Article 2(c) of CEDAW requires States to "establish legal protection of the rights of
women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and
other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination."
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meet that goal is ultimately a very local and contextual judgment to
make. Shachar is to be applauded for describing and analyzing so well
the inherent problem of political claims of "culture" regarding women,
and for explaining how various attempts worldwide to deal with cultural
claims have simultaneously succeeded and failed. Future implementation
of Shachar's suggestions should be watched with anticipation; both in-
ternational human rights law and women stand to benefit.
